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Malcolm 1 
Finances and Revolutionary Responsibilities: 
Lorient’s Municipal Government, 1789-1790 
On the 2nd of August 1789, Lorient’s permanent committee received word from their 
deputy to the National Assembly that France’s finance minister, Jacques Necker, had been 
reinstated in office.1 Widely viewed as the savior of France, Necker’s dismissal the previous 
month had sparked unease and unrest, most visibly in the storming of the Bastille on July 14th.2 
The merchants who dominated Lorient’s permanent committee were distraught by his dismissal 
in part because they were hoping for his support to dismantle the privileges of mercantilism. “At 
the very instant” that the news was announced, Ledoux, the city’s representative of painters, 
sculptures, and engravers, “entered and offered to the assembly the large portrait of Mr. Necker” 
for the city hall.3 After thanking him “from their hearts,” the committee immediately wrote to 
Necker relating their joy at his return and their everlasting friendship.4  
The next day, they hastily scrawled a letter to their deputy, Joseph Delaville-Leroux, 
stating emphatically that “we have been waiting with extreme impatience for the return of Mr. 
Necker, and we are celebrating it tomorrow by inaugurating his portrait which we will carry in 
triumph to the city hall with an escort” composed of three hundred militiamen from different 
regiments “and all of our youth.”5 On August 4th, the minutes recorded that “all the corps, 
military, ecclesiastical, and judiciary, from the cities of Port Louis and Lorient” participated in 
the “pompous” ceremony celebrating Necker’s return and Ledoux’s donation.6  
                                                 
1 Archives Municipales (AM) Lorient, BB7, 19. 
2 AM Lorient BB15, 96. Timothy Tackett, The Coming of the Terror Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015: 
43-5, 54-7.  
3 AM Lorient BB7, 19. Louis Chaumeil. Les Journées de 89, d’après DelavilleLeroux, député de Lorient aux États-
Généraux: Juillet 89 à Lorient. Lorient: Imprimiere du Nouvelliste du Morbihan, 1940: 92-94.  
4 AM Lorient BB7, 20-21. 
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In their next few letters to Delaville-Leroux, the committee painstakingly recounted their 
“solemn ceremony regarding the portrait of Monsieur Necker.”7 On August 7th, the committee 
complained about Delaville-Leroux’s “silence” regarding their previous letters and sent Necker 
another letter.8 Their impatient need for recognition was highly unusual. Yet their concern over 
his lack of enthusiasm would prove to be justified. Delaville-Leroux was preoccupied. Led by 
the Breton Club on the night of August 4, 1789, deputies of the National Assembly surrendered 
their feudal rights and tax exemptions to the nation on behalf of their constituents.9 Enthused by 
the sudden possibility of creating a truly national system of laws, neither Delaville-Leroux nor 
Necker would ever acknowledge Lorient’s celebration. 
In early August 1789, both Delaville-Leroux and his constituents in Lorient were 
struggling to overcome their government’s dire financial straits. Like the rest of France, their 
goals were shaped by their particular local history. The history of Lorient – literally “The East” – 
was intimately entangled with the French state’s mercantilist polices towards the East Indies. It 
had been founded in 1666 to serve as a company town for the Compagnie des Indes (CDI).10 
Throughout the eighteenth-century, Lorient had the privilege of being the sole legal port of entry 
for ships returning from the East Indies (a status known as the port de retours).11 Beginning in 
1785, the third iteration of this mercantilist body, the Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes (NCDI) had 
                                                 
7 AM Lorient BB14, 135. 
8 AM Lorient BB14, 137.  
9 This night is often referred to as the abolition of feudalism. Michael P. Fitzsimmons, The Night the Old Regime 
Ended: August 4, 1789, and the French Revolution University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.  
10 Louis Chaumeil. « Abrégé d’histoire de Lorient de la fondation (1666) à nos jours (1939). » Annales de Bretagne, 
46: 1 (1939): 70, 75. To understand this phenomenon of purpose-built cities, refer to James C. Scott. Seeing like a 
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998: 85-180. 
11 Gérard Le Bouëdec et Christophe Cérino. Lorient Ville Portuaire: Une nouvelle histoire des origines à nos jours. 
Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2017: 15-24, 30-34, 38-9. Armel de Wismes. La Vie quotidienne dans les 
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140. Michael Kwass. Contraband: Louis Mandarin and the Making of a Global Underground. Cambridge: Harvard 
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Finances and Revolutionary Responsibilities 
Malcolm 3 
 
an absolute monopoly on French trade to the East Indies.12 However, Lorient’s economy had 
suffered from NCDI’s practice of bringing their own workers to Lorient rather than hiring people 
from the region. Through the celebration of Necker and the surrendering of feudal rights, 
Lorient’s permanent committee and deputy were laying the groundwork for convincing Necker 
and the National Assembly to revoke the NCDI’s trade privileges. Hopefully, this task could be 
accomplished without sacrificing the city’s privileged status as the port de retours. 
Lorient’s residents and city officials sought to protect the city’s privileged status even as 
they decried the NCDI’s trade privilege as illegitimate. The city leaders’ sense of responsibility 
towards the nation was premised on an expectation of the enjoyment of both privilege and 
liberty. I examine the minutes and correspondence of Lorient’s municipal governments: the ad-
hoc permanent committee in 1789 and the municipal council which replaced it in 1790 when the 
National Assembly created a new administrative structure for France. From September 1789 to 
May 1790, the municipal governments were largely occupied with fulfilling two main 
obligations: navigating the shortage of grain and paying a new national tax, the patriotic 
contribution. Using a trans-local approach to the grain crisis and the patriotic contribution in 
Lorient allows for a fine-grained analysis of the intersections between liberty and privilege in the 
early French Revolution. 
In analyzing the fiscal and financial responsibilities of Lorient’s municipal government, 
this study builds on earlier social and economic histories of the French Revolution. 
Historiographically, these modes of analysis flourished during the reign of Marxists 
interpretations of the Revolution.13 After the revisionists overthrew strict notions of class 
                                                 
12 Glenn J. Ames. Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade. DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1996: 17-19, 57. 
13 See, for instance, the works of Alfred Soboul. Also: Alfred Cobban. The Social Interpretation of the French 
Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964. 
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warfare, histories of political culture predominated.14 The “linguistic turn” intensified this trend 
towards discursive analyses.15 In this current, post-revisionist moment, social and economic 
histories are re-emerging.16 New studies of the financial origins of the French Revolution have 
increasingly taken a more global approach.17 Because Lorient’s history is so entangled with that 
of French global commerce, this paper is able to bridge some of the literature between metropole 
and global studies. 
More specifically, my work combines literature on privilege and fiscal reform, poor 
relief, and municipal governments during the early Revolution. Although taxation and poor relief 
both drained “often dilapidated finances” of municipal treasuries, the two have rarely been 
studied in conjunction with one another.18 Instead of seeking to understand the financial origins 
of the Revolution,19 I analyze the beginning moments when municipal officials had to decide 
what policies should be continued and which were no longer applicable. Furthermore, the few 
                                                 
14 François Furet. Penser la Révolution française. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1978. Keith Michael Baker. Inventing 
the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth-Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. Lynn Hunt. Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984. 
15 Sophia Rosenfeld. A Revolution in Language: The Problem of Signs in Late Eighteenth-Century France. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001. Marisa Linton. The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France. Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 2001. David A. Bell. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003. Judith Surkis. “When was the Linguistic Turn? A Genealogy,” American Historical 
Review 117:3 (2012): 700-722. 
16 Rebecca L. Spang, “Paradigms and Paranoia: How Modern Is the French Revolution?” The American Historical 
Review 108:1 (2003): 144. Rafe Blaufarb, The Great Demarcation: The French Revolution and the Invention of 
Modern Property. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Charles Walton. “Capitalism’s Alter Ego: The Birth of 
Reciprocity in Eighteenth-Century France,” Critical Historical Studies (2018). 
17 C.A. Bayly. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons. Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2004. Lynn Hunt. “The Global Financial Origins of 1789.” In The French Revolution in 
Global Perspective. Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson, Eds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013: 32-43. Paul Cheney. Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010. 
18 For taxation, I primarily draw on Michael Kwass. Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century 
France: Liberté, Egalité, Fiscalité. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. For poor relief, Colin Jones. 
Charity and bienfaisance: The Treatment of the Poor in the Montpellier Region, 1740-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. (quote at 166). Alan Forrest. The French Revolution and the Poor. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1981. Charles Tilly. “Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe,” In The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe. Charles Tilly, Ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975: 380-455. 
19 For instance, John Shovlin. The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French 
Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
Finances and Revolutionary Responsibilities 
Malcolm 5 
 
studies that have acknowledged the patriotic contribution have often limited their discussion to a 
brief discursive analysis. In contrast, I follow its implementation from voluntary donations to the 
enforcement of national standards of collection. This combined approach for poor relief and 
taxation also provides greater insight into municipal governments’ interactions with different 
levels of administration and new national regulations.20 In taking these administrative 
interactions into account, Lorient’s municipal governments’ complicated attitudes towards 
privilege comes into stark relief.21 In stressing Lorient’s officials joint desires for continuity and 
change, I highlight their inconsistent attitudes towards the past. 
Like the other members of the Breton Club, Delaville-Leroux prioritized abolishing 
privilege (private law). Private laws would be replaced by a national constitution and set of laws 
which applied equally to all citizens. John Markoff has analyzed how many French people saw 
their own privileges as legitimate property rather than as illegitimate.22 Following August 4th, the 
National Assembly (and subsequent legislators) had to identify which privileges qualified as 
rights or property. Those legitimate privileges could not be confiscated without reimbursement. 
In some instances, privileges became universalized and turned into national law (such as the 
right not to be tortured but rather to be executed quickly via beheading). Making everyone 
subject to the same laws also meant that they could be subject to the same taxes. The destruction 
of privileges was therefore crucial for restoring the national treasury and preventing bankruptcy. 
The absolute destruction of privilege would, however, decimate Lorient’s economy because it 
completely depended on its privileged status as the port de retours. Delaville-Leroux therefore 
                                                 
20 In my analysis of the permanent committee and early Revolution, I refer to Lynn Hunt, Revolution and Urban 
Politics in Provincial France: Troyes and Reims, 1786-1790. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978. 
21 Rafe Blaufarb. The Politics of Fiscal Privilege in Provence, 1530s-1830s. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University Press, 2012. John Markoff. The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French 
Revolution. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996.  
22 Markoff, The Abolition of Feudalism 
Finances and Revolutionary Responsibilities 
Malcolm 6 
 
had to balance the specific financial needs of his constituents with solving the national crisis.  
Like most of Brittany, Lorient was run by a permanent committee throughout most of 
1789.23 While a widespread phenomenon, these committees were fundamentally the result of 
local political action. Lynn Hunt has shown that “they were not created by the national 
government, and they did not derive their legitimacy from being part of a national framework – 
except insofar as they symbolized the communes’ participation in the national revolution.”24 In 
Lorient, the permanent committee did not destroy the preexisting municipal government, but it 
did render it irrelevant. As these permanent committees lacked any legal basis, their authority 
rested on popular support. In order to justify their power, committee members had to fulfill their 
responsibilities. In the fall of 1789, faced with unrest due to the uncertain future of the city’s 
privilege and economy, Lorient’s committee members prioritized responding to the grain crisis. 
There had been similar shortages of grain earlier in the century, but, as Judith Miller has shown, 
the 1789-1790 shortage was compounded by inexperienced administrators’ mistakes such as the 
enforcement of free trade laws.25 Furthermore, in 1789, Lorient’s population was economically 
insecure, due to unprecedented levels of unemployment resulting from the NCDI’s policies. As a 
result, the committee members had to take on the responsibility of helping the population fend 
off starvation. Otherwise, the city’s inhabitants might view their authority as illegitimate, and 
political instability might ensue.  
Lorient’s permanent committee was heavily invested in portraying themselves and the 
city’s population as ideal revolutionaries. They believed that this self-presentation would aid 
them as they competed with all of France for Necker’s attention. In addition to calling for the 
                                                 
23 Hunt, Revolution and Urban Politics, 134-136. 
24 Hunt, Revolution and Urban Politics, 142. 
25 Judith Miller, Mastering the Market: The State and the Grain Trade in Northern France, 1700-1860 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998): 93-128. 
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suppression of the NCDI in their cahier de doléances [notebook of grievances], Lorient’s 
electors had chosen their deputy on the basis of his personal connections to Necker.26 Like some 
of the members of Lorient’s permanent committee, Delaville-Leroux was a merchant who had 
moved to the city to be more involved with the East Indies trade. Despite his prior relationship 
with Necker, Delaville-Leroux was unsuccessful in his attempts to get the popular finance 
minister to pay much attention to him or to Lorient’s plight. A banker from Geneva, Necker had 
won admiration after publishing accounts of the state’s spending. The French people widely 
viewed him as the epitome of virtue and the most trustworthy and capable individual to bring the 
state’s finances onto firm ground.27 To accomplish this immense task, he had to find a method of 
bringing more money into the state’s coffers – preferably without raising taxes.28  
In September 1789, the National Assembly began to call for voluntary donations to help 
the nation pay its bills. Necker argued that these donations would keep the state financially 
afloat. Within a month, legislators specified that these patriotic contributions were so vitally 
crucial that they needed to consist of roughly a quarter of an individual’s yearly salary, although 
they could be paid over two or three years. Once the amounts due were recorded, the government 
would be able to spend the money before it was collected.29 By January 1790, any pretense of 
these contributions being voluntary slipped away, and their official status as a tax was sanctioned 
by the king. After their celebration of Necker’s return did not earn them any recognition, the 
committee hoped that their early patriotic contribution would provoke acknowledgement. 
Lorient’s permanent committee hoped to rely on voluntary donations to fulfill its 
                                                 
26 AM Lorient 5Z122, 16; BB6, 40-41. Gérard Le Bouëdec. « Joseph Delaville-Leroux (1747-1803): entre négoce et 
politique, ou la carrière du premier parlementaire lorientais, » Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de L’Ouest, 124: 2 
(2017): 83-86. 
27 Marisa Linton, The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001): 198-208.  
28 Rebecca Spang. Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2015: 67. 
29 Spang, Stuff and Money, 66. 
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financial responsibility to the city’s residents and its fiscal responsibility to the National 
Assembly. This tactic proved successful with their new poor relief program. Although their 
method of obtaining enough grain for the city’s population provoked enmity from their 
neighbors, the program flourished throughout the winter. Generous residents – and the NCDI – 
kept the city’s treasury flooded with money. The patriotic contribution played out differently. 
Once it was transformed into a tax, the National Assembly expected every municipality to follow 
the same guidelines in assessing and collecting it. Lorient’s municipal officials resisted. Citing 
the city’s former tax-exempt status, they argued that the new regulations could not be 
implemented. While the National Assembly would ultimately uphold the city’s privilege as port 
de retours as legitimate, they were not as lenient with fiscal privileges. Lorient’s officials were 
ordered to conform. These two entangled responsibilities intersected with legal and enacted 
notions of liberty and privilege.  
 
The Sun of Lorient 
By taking a trans-local approach to studying Lorient’s municipal government, I highlight 
its interactions with global commerce, the national government, and neighboring cities. Custom-
built in 1666 for the CDI, Lorient’s newness set it apart from other major colonial port cities. 
Bordeaux was “a most important ecclesiastical, judicial, and cultural center” to the extent that 
“the prestige of the city was not based on its trading position alone”30 Other large port cities, 
such as Marseilles and Nantes, similarly served crucial functions outside of their trading 
connections.31 In contrast, from its founding to the 1760s, Lorient was essentially a company 
town. Most of its residents were involved in one way or another, with the trade to the East Indies. 
                                                 
30 Alan Forrest. Society and Politics in Revolutionary Bordeaux. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975: 19. 
31 William Scott. Terror and Repression in Revolutionary Marseilles. New York: Macmillian, 1973: 1-21. 
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A large percentage Lorient’s population had immigrated from other regions of France. These 
newcomers were drawn to Lorient because it was the gateway both to the Indian Ocean and to 
the United States, after the French involvement in the American War for Independence. During 
the eighteenth century, Lorient’s population grew from about six thousand to roughly twenty-
five thousand.32 
In its early history, Lorient’s sole raison d’être was to bolster French mercantilism. Its 
fate was intricately intertwined with that of the French East Indies Companies. The first CDI, 
established by Jean-Baptiste Colbert in 1664, was modeled after the British East Indies Company 
and the Dutch VOC. Colbert hoped that the CDI would increase France’s wealth and prestige on 
the global stage.33 However, the company routinely struggled to make a profit. In December 
1703, they turned the land of Lorient back over to the king, and the city was incorporated into the 
kingdom.34 For the next sixteen years, until the reorganization of the company, Lorient played 
only a small role in the company’s endeavors. Then, in 1719, John Law, the future controller 
general of finances, merged the first CDI with the Compagnie des Occidents. This new company 
now held a monopoly of trade with both the West and East Indies. Law encouraged people to 
buy shares in the new company to fund the royal bank that he had established. Prices 
skyrocketed. They plummeted more rapidly. After this fiasco, the company was dismantled. In 
1725, the crown granted a new company, the Compagnie des Indes Orientales (CDIO) the 
privilege of trade with the East Indies and Asia. In the wake of France’s crushing defeat at the 
hands of the British during the Seven Years War, the CDIO could no longer fund or maintain its 
                                                 
32 Chaumeil, « Abrégé d’histoire de Lorient, » 69, 71. Catherine Guillevic. L’Impact d’une ville nouvelle dans la 
Bretagne du XVIIIe siècle: Lorient & la Compagnie des Indes. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015: 18-
19. 
33 Ames, Colbert, Mercantilism 
34 Guillevic, L’impact d’une ville nouvelle, 19. 
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outposts in the Indian Ocean. In 1769, the CDIO officially dissolved. Lorient’s merchant 
community was worried that the city would be unable to sustain itself. However, its privilege as 
the port de retours was not rescinded. Much to its leaders’ surprise, Lorient flourished during the 
period of free trade.35 
Lorient’s delayed integration into royal administration impacted its relationship with its 
neighbors. Due to the high levels of immigrants, Lorient’s population mostly spoke French, 
while most of their neighbors spoke Breton. Governments of neighboring cities complained that 
Lorient had been imposed on the region. To prevent the wealth brought in from the colonies 
from staying centered in Lorient, individuals throughout the region regularly financed the 
Compagnie’s voyages in return for a share of the profits.36 Despite this benefit, municipal leaders 
and guild masters of neighboring cities argued that Lorient’s prestige lured the youth away from 
their original community.37 In the case of Hennebont, the district seat, these differences sparked 
a long-lasting rivalry, albeit one primarily perpetuated by Hennebont’s city leaders. The main 
bone of contention seems to have been Lorient’s tendency to hoard grain in times of shortages.38 
Lorient quickly became an economic center of the region, but its leaders were unable, even 
during the Revolution, to exert any kind of administrative authority over its neighbors.39  
Throughout the eighteenth century, Lorient’s merchants’ colonial economic ties marked 
its municipal government’s relationship with the national government. It gained several fiscal 
privileges. Louis XVI granted Lorient its own deputy to the Estates-General because of their 
                                                 
35 Elizabeth Cross. “The French East India Company and the Politics of Commerce in the Revolutionary Era.” PhD 
Dissertation, Harvard University, 2017. 
36 Guillevic, L’impact d’une ville nouvelle, 324-6. 
37 Guillevic, L’impact d’une ville nouvelle, 255-257, 264-270, 361-363. 
38 The history section of Hennebont’s municipal website has a section titled “In the shadow of the sun of Lorient,” 
which details the two cities’ disagreements over hierarchy throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
« Hennebont, 2000 ans d’histoire(s) au fil du Blavet, » http://www.hennebont.bzh/decourvir-hennebont/2000-ans-
dhistoire-et-de-patrimoine/hennebont-a-travers-les-siecles/  
39 Guillevic, L’impact d’une ville nouvelle, 333-365. 
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commercial ties.40 Technically, the deputy would represent the entire sénéchaussée of 
Hennebont.41 In the official notice, though, the King specified that the deputy chosen had to be 
“a merchant or shipowner from Lorient.”42  Some members of Lorient’s municipal government 
(including Jean-Marie Esnoul des Chatelès, the city’s mayor, Lapotaire, the assistant to the 
mayor who would later serve on the Conseil des Anciens, Le Mir and Barbarin, who would both 
later serve on the city’s permanent committee, Blanche, a wigmaker, and Marais, a wool 
merchant) took this royal favor seriously. They reminded Delaville-Leroux upon his election that 
although he represented the whole sénéchaussé, they were the ones who had chosen him.43 
Delaville-Leroux’s position as deputy was, in the eyes of his constituents, contingent on his 
ability to protect “the interests of our commerce.”44 This effectively meant the reestablishment of 
free trade.45  
With the establishment of the Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes in 1785, the Parisian 
bankers who primarily ran it brought their own dockworkers to Lorient. The city still maintained 
the privilege of port de retours, so the NCDI had no choice but to dock its ships there. Unlike 
previous companies, however, its directors did not invest back into the city’s economy. Not only 
were many dockworkers unemployed by the new policies, but other demographics suffered as 
well. Even merchants, who were not as negatively impacted, were dissatisfied by how little of 
the profits remained in Lorient. Paris seemed to be benefitting at the cost of Lorient.46  
                                                 
40 « Décision royale concernant la représentation aux États-Généraux de la Ville de Lorient, sénéchaussée 
d’Hennebont, 29 mars 1789 » In Recueil de documents relatifs à la convocation des États-Généraux de 1789. 
Volume 1, Tome 2. Armand Brette, Ed. Paris: 1894-1915: 269. 
41 A sénéchaussée was a judiciary, financial, and administrative district overseen by a royal officer (sénéchal) in 
charge of justice, roughly equivalent to a bailiff.  
42 « Décision royale concernant la représentation aux États-Généraux de la Ville de Lorient, » 269. 
43 AM Lorient BB6, 41. 
44 AM Lorient BB6, 41. 
45 Le Bouëdec, « Joseph Delaville-Leroux, » 83-86. 
46 Cross, “The French East Indies Company,” 
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Delaville-Leroux was not expected to achieve the feat of dismantling mercantilism on his 
own. Deputies from other port cities were also clamoring for the end of the NCDI because it was 
managed largely by Parisian shareholders. The port deputies criticized the shareholders for being 
unpatriotic. They portrayed the shareholders as being more intent on protecting their tax-exempt 
source of wealth than in the commercial health of France. Lorient and Delaville had therefore 
hoped that Necker, who, after all, wanted the state to have more sources of income, would be 
amenable to their request. Although the company did lose its privilege in April 1790, their belief 
in Necker was misguided. He quietly supported it and protected it from attacks during 1789.47 
Delaville-Leroux kept Lorient continuously updated with news from the Breton Club and 
the National Assembly. The deputies of Brittany, known as the Breton Club, were important in 
several key moments in the early Revolution. The Breton Club, including Delaville-Leroux, 
instigated the Third Estates’ refusal to complete roll call until the King authorized voting by head 
rather than by estate. This matter led to members of the Third Estate, along with some 
sympathetic clergy and liberal nobles, to form their own assembly and ultimately to swear an 
oath to never disband until they had given France a new constitution. The King eventually had to 
concede the point, and the Estates-General transformed into the National Assembly. The Breton 
Club also planned and initiated the giving up of privileges which resulted in the abolition of 
feudalism and privilege on August 4th. Delaville-Leroux explained to his constituents that, at the 
beginning of the evening session, the Breton deputies, starting with those from Rennes, 
“renounced their privileges.”48 With the abolition of private law, all provinces were now equal 
parts of the nation, and a national constitution could finally be written.49  
                                                 
47 Cross, “The French East Indies Company,” 
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His enthused description glossed over some key issues. Breton deputies had forfeited the 
very privileges which had been key to the region’s incorporation into France a few centuries 
back. Furthermore, Lorient’s very existence as a city had been made possible through the 
granting of certain privileges. Its economy continued to rely on its privileged position as the port 
de retours. If all privileges were truly abolished, how was the city going to survive? After 
effusive praise for French liberty and patriotism, Delaville-Leroux addressed the elephant in the 
room. “I dare hope that all privileges […] have been abolished as a consequence of this 
deliberation, including the privilege of the Compagnie des Indes and all other companies of the 
same sort. The license of the port of Lorient will be destroyed as well.”50 
On August 12th, Lorient’s permanent committee responded. After briefly acknowledging 
the benefits of the abolition of feudalism for all of France, they described local response. It was 
overwhelmingly negative. They reported that “a real schism between the members of the 
permanent committee and the municipality is forming.”51 To soften the blow of “this happy 
news,” committee members had given a rousing speech to the city’s residents about the 
incompatibility of privilege with patriotism.52 The blow still fell hard. To further complicate 
matters, the committee had since been informed that the directors of the NCDI were seeking to 
obtain “the promptest suppression of the city’s franchise” as port de retours.53 We are now, they 
wrote, “in a difficult place.”54 Delaville-Leroux must immediately convince Necker to interfere. 
Surely, he would see that Lorient’s privilege was “the same as the interest of the nation.”55 
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Lorient’s permanent committee’s acceptance of the general sacrifice of privilege was in 
apparent contradiction with their ardent desire to maintain their own. In fact, this inconsistency 
was par for the course for many towns and regions through France.56 Lorient’s city officials 
hoped that they would be able to convince the Finance Minister and the National Assembly of 
their worth to the nation. Eventually, they would be successful. The city retained its position as 
port de retours throughout most of the Revolution, though it eventually shared the privilege with 
Toulon, near Marseille.57 Until this position was secured, the permanent committee needed to 
quell the city’s population’s fear of the imminent destruction of what remained of their 
livelihoods.58 Unsure of their position, the committee’s members frantically sought to find means 
of maintaining the peace. In order to maintain control and provide political stability, the 
permanent committee had to balance its obligations to the city’s population with its desire to 
impress Necker. Both of these goals required money. The former would be addressed primarily 
through a new poor relief program, and the latter through the committee’s early obedience of 
new tax legislation.  
 
Feeding the Poor 
On December 2, 1789, the lower officers and gunners of a regiment of royal artillery 
colonial troops sent a message to Lorient’s permanent committee. They reminded the committee 
that their annual saints festival celebrating Saint Barbara, the patron of artillerymen, was 
scheduled to be held in two days. This year’s festival, however, would be markedly different. 
There would be no brioches. The officers wrote that they “believed it was their duty to replace 
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the consumption of brioches with the greater necessity of distributing bread to the poor.” The 
committee minutes recorded that the officers “came, as a result, to deposit the sum of 204 pounds 
[the normal cost of the regiments’ annual brioches] into the Caisse de Bienfaisance.” The 
committee expressed their “admiration and gratitude” for the regiment’s thoughtfulness for “the 
poor and suffering humanity.” The committee could not offer monetary recompense, lest they 
offend the officers’ “generosity and heroism.” They could, however, reward the donation with 
“all the publicity that they deserve.” The committee therefore decreed that “an extract of this 
present deliberation shall be printed” and “distributed throughout the city.” An additional copy 
“will be sent to the National Assembly this very day.”59 
Due to a combination of droughts and hailstorms, northern France had a particularly bad 
harvest in 1789. Judith Miller has shown how the relative inexperience of new administrators 
exacerbated the crisis, as they repeated mistakes from previous shortages.60 The most notable 
instance was when the National Assembly reinstituted the free circulation of grain on August 29, 
1789. This decree crippled regional or local administrators’ attempts to secure grain for their 
population.61 Local administrators often flouted this law. Some seized grain outright, while 
others reinstituted price controls.  
In contrast, Lorient’s permanent committee cooperated with this decree. They were wary 
of losing what support they had garnered in the National Assembly. Given that they were seeking 
the re-establishment of free trade with the East Indies, flagrantly flouting free trade laws at home 
would not have looked well. Furthermore, because of the city’s wealth (diminished though it 
was), the committee members believed that they could obtain sufficient provisions for the city’s 
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needy by preserving free trade. In order to capitalize on the situation, the committee created a 
Caisse de Bienfaisance in September 1789.62 They called on the city’s wealthy residents to 
donate to this “Philanthropy Fund” and used the money to set up a poor relief program in order 
to shore up their own legitimacy and authority. While they were able to maintain political 
stability on a municipal level, the neighboring cities’ residents and governments complained that 
Lorient’s officials were undermining their stability through buying up all of their grain.  
The permanent committee presented these donations as voluntary yet vitally necessary. 
Because so many dockworkers were unemployed due to the NCDI’s policies, the committee 
explicitly expected its officials and merchants to fix the problem. They wrote: “In order to enable 
the city to be in a state to carry out its intentions, the administrators of the Compagnie des Indes 
and the merchants, traders of Indian goods, are requested to donate to the fund.”63 They did not 
initially respond. In the meantime, other individuals tried to pick up the slack. On October 5, the 
committee learned that a “letter had circulated” among the city’s militias “carrying an invitation 
to flood the Caisse de Bienfaisance” with donations “to relieve poverty.”64 Donations only 
trickled in until women’s actions in Paris and Versailles sparked fears of the dangers that a 
starving populace posed to political stability. 
Meanwhile in Paris, the situation had reached a breaking point. “On the morning of 
October 5 [1789], upset by the recent events in Versailles and tired of standing in bread lines, 
several hundred Parisian women began mobilizing.”65 “The legion of women” marched on 
Versailles.66 Significantly, they were accompanied by parts of the National Guard, including the 
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Marquis de La Fayette. Lorient’s committee heard of this momentous event within the week due 
to Delaville-Leroux’s diligence. Trying desperately to capture the tense atmosphere, the fear of 
violence, and its impacts on the National Assembly, he included as many details as possible in 
his letters to his constituents.67 He described how “the women’s deputies entered the house of the 
king, who received them with goodwill and promised them to give new orders as to Paris’s 
sustenance.”68 Then, they “demanded entrance” into the National Assembly “to express their 
grievances.”69 As the women “murmured in the gallery,” the Assembly discussed how defuse the 
situation. They decided to bring grain to Paris at all costs.70 Delaville-Leroux explained that 
because of these women’s insistence on confronting the King and demands for regulation of 
grain prices, the King and the National Assembly would be moving to Paris.71  
Replying to Delaville-Leroux’s letter recounting the events of the October Days, the 
committee reported that “it will be very difficult to supply the cities of Brittany with enough 
grain.”72 “The situation is more distressing than we feared,” they continued, as now some 
individuals might feel justified in concluding “that only the use of violence and force will 
overcome the obstinate dread” of starvation.73 After anxiously worrying about the people’s 
reactions, they then thanked him for providing so many details as it allowed them “to forecast a 
total catastrophe, which would undoubtedly have been the effect if not for your characteristic 
prudence.”74 Their concern with the plight of the city’s impoverished population began to take 
on a more urgent note. 
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After replying to Delaville-Leroux, Lorient’s permanent committee beseeched their 
fellow citizens once again for help.75 They also established a committee of subsistence.76 Within 
the week of the establishment of the committee of subsistence, it received a windfall. In “an act 
of generosity and patriotism,” Paul-Jacques-Augustin Périer gave “40,000 pounds to be used for 
purchasing grain.”77 Périer was a Colonel of the national dragoons and a founding director of the 
NCDI. He was one of only two company directors to reside in Lorient. In May 1789, the Parisian 
directors blamed Périer for not having prevented Lorient’s deputy and municipal government 
from being so openly antagonistic towards the company. When the Parisian administrators 
learned from Lorient’s permanent committee’s call for charitable donations, they ordered Périer 
to volunteer the extraordinary sum of 40,000 pounds for poor relief.78 They hoped that using 
company funds to underwrite the city’s poor relief program would prove to the permanent 
committee that the NCDI had the city’s best interests at heart.  
The permanent committee accepted the money, but they did not record Périer’s status or 
the origin of the money in their minutes. Ledoux’s spontaneous donation of a portrait in August 
had elicited pages of effusive praise. In contrast, the committee brusquely ignored the NCDI 
directors’ calculated gesture of friendship. Even though the committee had explicitly and 
repeated asked the NCDI to donate to the Caisse de Bienfaisance, when the company did so, 
through Périer, the committee did not publicize their support. The money Périer had offered, 
from their point of view, rightfully belonged to the city. After all, had the NCDI not funneled the 
majority of the profits to Paris or replaced the city’s dockworkers with their own employees, then 
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the permanent committee would not be in the situation of having to provide for the city’s 
population. The committee did not even bother to mention the exchange to Delaville-Leroux. 
Nor did they alter his instructions regarding the NCDI. Additional donations began to flow in to 
the Caisse de Bienfaisance. Botenau, one of Lorient’s bakers “offered to give two barrels of 
grain up to the commune.”79 Other individuals donated anonymously. None of the donations 
even touched the level of Périer and the NCDI’s contribution. Yet all the other donors were 
thanked profusely. 
Now that the project was sufficiently funded, the subsistence committee needed to 
transmute silver into bread. Two days after Périer’s grandiose gesture of generosity, an 
anonymous presenter to the committee argued that because of the actions of the neighboring 
cities’ governments, “the circulation of grain is not as free as it should be.”80 The committee 
must take action to bring grain to free markets. Coincidentally, the only true free markets in the 
region were in Lorient. Enforcing the law of free circulation of grain would therefore also fill the 
stomachs of the city’s residents. In response, the committee ramped up their policy of using the 
city’s militias to bring hoarded grain to market. Fearful of accusations of confiscation, they 
transported the grain to markets across the region.  
Lorient’s subsistence committee faced the Herculean task of being effective within the 
constraints of the mandate of free trade. Lorient’s committee used the vocabulary and logic of 
‘free’ trade to create an effective monopsony. Using the donated money, they began to buy grain 
for the city. To acquire enough grain, they had to send representatives to neighboring cities, such 
as Sarzeau and Hennebont, to purchase grain from their markets.81 Because of the Caisse de 
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Bienfaisance and the city’s reputation for wealth, these representatives were able to consistently 
outbid merchants from other cities. Lorient’s city leaders had hoarded grain earlier in the 
century. Consequently, this new method of buying up from neighboring cities’ grains prompted 
pushback and criticism by those cities’ governments. Bakers from Hennebont sent several letters 
to Lorient’s permanent committee denouncing their practice of having individuals buy grain on 
behalf of the city. Citing Lorient’s previous military actions to maintain the free circulation of 
grain, Hennebont’s city government questioned the apparent “malicious intentions” of their 
“fellow patriots and brothers.”82  
In their confrontation, bakers from Lorient and Hennebont disagreed over the meaning of 
liberty. In their myriad petitions, Hennebont’s bakers argued that it was manifestly unfair for 
representatives of Lorient to use communal money to purchase grain. They believed that using 
communal funds, such as the Caisse de Bienfaisance, qualified as a form of confiscation. No 
individual merchant could match Lorient’s wealth. Backed by their city’s permanent committee, 
Hennebont’s bakers argued that Lorient’s committee was manipulating the circulation of grain 
by using the city’s militias to force it to come to market. Through the combination of the city’s 
military and economic might, the directors of Lorient’s poor relief program were ensuring that 
neighboring cities would be unable to buy enough grain to feed their citizens. Under the national 
mandate of free trade, Hennebont’s bakers and residents did not have a chance to ensure that 
they could obtain enough grain for themselves. They thought very little of having the liberty to 
starve. 
In its response to the petitions from Hennebont, Lorient’s permanent committee defended 
their citizens’ right to buy as much grain as they could afford, regardless of the money’s source. 
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Lorient’s city leaders believed that they would profit from free trade both on a local level 
(purchasing enough grain) and on a global scale (bringing in Indian and colonial goods). In both 
instances, their attempts to have free trade legally enforced was based on the premise of 
believing that their wealth would ensure their benefits. In both instances, residents and 
governments of neighboring cities criticized Lorient’s residents for hoarding its wealth rather 
than enriching the region (accusations that Lorient’s government hurled at the Parisian directors 
of the NCDI). 
Throughout most of October and November of 1789, Lorient’s committee of subsistence 
focused on obtaining as much grain as possible. On November 30, they estimated that the first 
distribution would cost approximately 7,171 livres, 10 sols, and 6 deniers in grain alone.83 They 
did not record, however, how much grain this sum was able to purchase. Hunt tracked the prices 
of grain in Troyes and Reims. From October-November 1789, the price of raw wheat per pound 
was approximately 6 pounds.84 If the price was similar in Lorient, this expenditure would have 
purchased approximately 1200 pounds of grain.  
Despite their accumulation of grain, the subsistence committee had not yet decided how 
they were going to distribute charity to the city’s poor. In November, Monsieur Ténaud, a 
merchant associated with the Compagnie des Indes, gave a series of speeches on the “bureau of 
unfortunates” to the permanent committee on behalf of the police bureau.85 He starkly outlined 
the need to determine the worthiness of impoverished citizens. In keeping with Ancien Règime 
restrictions on charity, Ténaud argued that the committee had to ensure that the city’s charity 
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would not include people without “good morals.”86 In order to enforce the prerequisite of 
upstanding morality, the committee would have to examine the background of all individuals 
seeking charity. Ténaud suggested excluding prostitutes, beggars, individuals with no history of 
legitimate employment, and people who could not explain why they were in Lorient.87 In his 
report, Ténaud implied that individuals who had become unemployed due to the Nouvelle 
Compagnie des Indes’ policies had legitimate reasons to expect the city’s government to take 
care of them. The NCDI was still not abolished, and the city’s privileged position was still 
threatened. Unemployed workers had every right to be concerned about their ability to provide 
for their family – and every right to accuse the permanent committee of not providing for them.  
Temporarily abandoning their pretense of unconstrained generosity, the permanent 
committee acknowledged the rationality of the police bureau’s arguments.88 They passed new 
decrees regulating the poor relief program. Each district was required to create their own 
commission of subsistence. These new commissions would be overseen both by the districts’ 
presidents and the permanent committee’s own subsistence committee. To ensure conformity 
with the new regulations, the permanent committee “unanimously named M. Ténaud to be one of 
the Commissaires presiding over the Bureau of Charity.”89 Under his oversight, each of these 
commissions would compile a list of people in their neighborhoods who were seeking charity. 
They had to record “the state of these persons, their reasons for claiming the assistance of the 
commune, the number of their home and the name of the street, the age of these persons, the 
number and age of their children, the motive of their need, and finally the number of pounds of 
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bread they judged necessary to be accorded to them each week.”90 The district presidents and the 
city’s subsistence committee would review these registers. Finally, all of the information would 
be doublechecked by the police bureau. Only after all this demographical information was 
collected and verified would the city begin distributed tickets for bread.91 The district 
commissions would personalize each ticket to the individual recipient. Then, the bakers would 
mark the free loaves of bread with the initials of the bureau of charity, so as to discourage theft.92 
After the first week of distribution, Ténaud reported back to the permanent committee on 
behalf of the Charity Bureau that the number of recipients was undoubtedly going to increase a 
lot throughout the winter. He argued that Lorient must shoulder its responsibility regardless of 
the cost, for “to refuse succor to those who ask for it and who have true needs, that is, without 
doubt, something which our humanity and charity would never be able to permit.”93 Each 
subsequent week brought an increase in the number of families seeking aid.94 Lorient’s 
municipal government could not neglect their responsibility to the city’s poor without running 
the risk of local food riots. But the city officials’ responsibilities were not limited to poor relief. 
At the same time that Lorient’s city leaders were trying to prevent local unrest through the 
establishment of a poor relief program, they were also obligated to fulfill their fiscal 
responsibilities to the new national government.  
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Burdened with the nation’s crushing debt but prohibited from declaring bankruptcy and 
refusing to raise taxes until the ratification of a constitution, the National Assembly asked the 
French people to send patriotic contributions to help them cover the nation’s debt. This was not 
one of the Assembly’s more radical actions, as this method of raising funds without technically 
taxing the people was hardly new.95 In one sense, just as the guillotine universalized a privilege 
previously limited to the nobility (the right to be executed by beheading), the transformation of 
impositions into contributions nominally extended the fiscal privilege to decide one’s tax amount 
from the clergy to the whole of France. Yet, as Michael Kwass has convincingly shown, the 
clergy had not exactly been at full liberty to determine the amount of their “free gifts” to the 
king.96 Likewise, the size of individual patriotic contributions would be legislated by the 
National Assembly. Individuals making over 400 pounds a year were required to donate 25% of 
their yearly income.97 
Although this rhetoric of gifts in lieu of – or in addition to – taxes had an illustrious 
history,98 the advent of the Revolution seems to have marked an increase in the state’s call for 
voluntary donations and contributions. Lynn Hunt posits that “impôts [impositions] were 
replaced with contributions, which sounded more voluntary.”99 On a rather prosaic note, the 
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voluntary rhetoric reflects the Assembly’s lack of authority to inflict more taxes on the nation. 
The Assembly had begun by declaring all existing taxes to be illegal because they had been 
instituted without the nation’s consent. Yet the government desperately needed more sources of 
income, not fewer. The patriotic contribution was therefore initially presented as a stop-gap 
measure to keep the government afloat while the Assembly drafted France’s constitution.100 
Simultaneously voluntary and mandatory, the tax provided difficult to collect.  
Lorient’s permanent committee hoped that their early contribution would elicit praise and 
support from the National Assembly and Necker.101 Lorient’s city leaders’ sense of responsibility 
towards the nation was premised on an expectation of the enjoyment of both privilege and 
liberty. As Lorient’s committee wrote to Delaville-Leroux, the city’s residents “will give, with 
pleasure, the last centime [penny] of their fortune to the national treasury, but if the Ancien 
Régime continues to survive, this patriotic generosity will freeze over.”102  
In August 1789, Lorient’s committee wrote to Delaville-Leroux that he must immediately 
obtain “liberty of commerce with the East Indies” and “the destruction of the cruel, tax-exempt 
franchise,” more commonly known as the NCDI.103 They chastised Delaville-Leroux for not 
completing his task quickly enough. If privileges had already been eradicated, they argued, then 
there ought to be no obstacle in abolishing an entity created and sustained solely through 
privilege.  
Openly irritated, Delaville-Leroux explained that he was in a bit of a bind. Other deputies 
were accusing him of contradiction because he was trying to ensure that Lorient’s privilege as 
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the port de retours for the East Indies would be preserved even after the NCDI was abolished.104 
The committee would do well to remember that the city was likewise shot through with 
privilege. This contradictory stance towards privileges was not unusual. Rather, it characterized 
the arduous process of separating out illegitimate privileges from legitimate properties and 
rights.105 Like other communities across France, Lorient’s officials sought to convince the 
national government that their privileges were legitimate and beneficial to the nation. 
Nevertheless, these accusations were clearly a source of unease for Delaville-Leroux. 
His position, Delaville-Leroux continually reminded his constituents, was hardly being 
helped by the committee’s failure to prove the city’s worth to the state. Lorient’s initial patriotic 
contribution, which totaled roughly three times Necker’s personal donation to the National 
Assembly, was deemed insufficient. Delaville-Leroux wrote to the permanent committee that as 
Lorient was known to be “one of the richest cities in the kingdom,” their patriotic contribution 
showed that “without a doubt, the poorest are the most generous.”106 “If Lorient wanted to 
benefit from free commerce with the Indies,” he continued, then their “patriotic gifts would have 
to be much larger.”107 
Throughout France, the government faced extreme difficulty in collecting the new tax. 
When Necker first suggested the patriotic contribution, he simply asked citizens to truthfully 
report their income. Citing the innate honesty of the French people, he argued that it was 
unnecessary for the state to use force, as relying on voluntary declarations and contributions 
would easily fill the treasury.108 Early model forms intended to help individuals calculate the size 
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of their contributions encouraged individuals to give a contribution which exceeded the 
minimum.109 In early October 1789, Paul-Jacques-Augustin Périer, one of the NCDI’s directors, 
came to Lorient’s city hall to make his patriotic contribution. He gave 20,000 pounds. Several 
committee members knew for a fact that “this sum greatly exceeded a quarter of his revenue.”110 
The committee was therefore astonished by his devotion to the state. Whereas they would not 
acknowledge the magnanimous donation he would make on behalf of the NCDI to the Caisse de 
Bienfaissance later that week, they “ardently applauded” his remarkable contribution to the 
national treasury.111 However praised it was, Périer’s generous contribution did not inspire 
emulation. It is the only example in Lorient’s municipal archives where an individual gave more 
than the expected amount.  
As voluntary contributions did not refill the treasury, the National Assembly changed 
tactics and ordered municipal governments to compile registers of declarations of their residents’ 
tax obligations. They also distributed forms for “people who have already made a gift to the 
National Assembly” and who now “wanted it to count towards their patriotic contribution.”112 At 
a time when the national treasury needed as much cash as possible, this resistance against paying 
taxes shows how the French people did not simply accept the burden of new responsibilities. The 
National Assembly had to be careful not to test the limits of the nation’s generosity.  
The difficulty in collecting taxes was compounded by the National Assembly’s 
inconsistency about who ought to be determining the declarations of how much each individual 
owed. The Assembly’s initial decision that municipal governments should collect declarations 
produced mixed results. In an attempt to expedite the process of tax collection, the National 
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Assembly decreed that the officials who had the most experience in collecting capitations should 
be placed in charge of the patriotic contribution. The capitation resembled the patriotic 
contribution in several ways. They were both assessed and collected on an individual basis.113 
Furthermore, the capitation had been intended to be a universal tax. In 1789, it was the tax with 
the least number of exceptions.114 The Assembly hoped that keeping the same administrators 
would smooth the process of checking the new tax rolls against receipts of previous taxes.115 
However, this decree could not be implemented in Lorient. Residents of the city had not been 
obligated to pay the capitation for roughly sixty years.116 Its government therefore lacked both 
the tax rolls and the tax officials which would have been the most helpful in establishing the size 
of individuals’ patriotic contributions.  
As a result, Lorient’s permanent committee was initially at somewhat of a loss as to how 
to figure out how much each person should pay. In early November 1789, Monsieur Le 
Corvaisier fils, whose father owned the main supply ships for the navy and colonies, announced 
to the committee that the official method of self-declaration was simply not working.117 The 
committee expressed their appreciation of his forthright honesty. When they returned to the issue 
of how “to more precisely collect patriotic gifts,” they decided to create a new office within the 
treasury to oversee the declarations.118 The committee “unanimously nominated” Le Corvaisier 
fils because they knew that “his patriotic zeal and his well-known love for the public good would 
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not allow him to refuse.”119 Upon his appointment, Le Corvaisier fils denounced previous 
administrators for being too lenient. He criticized their apparent reluctance to prioritize the well-
being of the state. To show his self-sacrificial devotion to the state, Le Corvaisier fils voluntarily 
paid what his assessed amount should have been.120 The nation was now richer by five pounds. 
His dedication to the public good would not go unrewarded. After his election to office following 
the reorganization of municipal government, the new city council reimbursed him eighty pounds 
for his service to the state.121 
In January 1790, the National Assembly instituted oversight of the municipal officials. 
They required that “the registers of declarations created by the municipalities” would be 
approved by three layers of bureaus and commissioners, including the district capital’s municipal 
officers.122 Later, the district and departmental administrators would also review the 
declarations.123 Understanding the collection of the patriotic contribution therefore requires a 
brief overview of new administrative standardization of France. Unlike the previous provinces 
(such as Brittany), the new departments (like Morbihan) all shared the same laws and 
administrative structures. In Morbihan, Vannes, which held the local bishopric and had been 
administratively important under the Ancien Règime, became the seat of the department.124 Its 
city leaders, particularly the bishops and ecclesiastical authorities, had never really approved of 
the establishment of Lorient. In their cahier de doléances, members of Vannes’s First and Third 
Estates called for the suppression of Lorient’s privilege as port de retours.125 Rather than move 
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the administrative fonctionnaires to the new city of Lorient, the National Assembly chose to 
maintain the intercity power relationships in the region. 
With that ambition thus thwarted, Lorient’s city leaders hoped that the city could at least 
become the district seat. In December 1789, the National Assembly ordered an assembly to be 
held in Vannes to pick the seats of the newly-created districts.126 Two weeks later, Lorient’s 
permanent committee sent two letters to Paris. The first ordered Delaville-Leroux to insist that 
Lorient become the district seat; the second announced to all Breton deputies that the Vannes 
assembly had chosen Lorient.127 Hennebont city government denounced the latter as an outright 
lie.128 The cities’ rivalry became an issue of national concern. In January 1790, the National 
Assembly’s Constitutional Committee ordered Morbihan administrations to “choose once and for 
all whether the city of Hennebont or Lorient should be capital of their district.”129 Once the 
departmental administrators discovered the deception of Lorient’s permanent committee, they 
chose Hennebont.130 Because of the fallout over choosing the district capital, neither the district 
nor departmental administrators were willing to give Lorient’s municipal officials any leeway. 
Instead, they treated their requests and complaints with a high degree of skepticism. 
While the district and department administrations were being formed, municipal 
governments were also being standardized. In January 1790, Lorient’s permanent committee 
oversaw elections to the new municipal council.131 Two months later, the council finally 
addressed the matter of the city’s patriotic contributions. Although the payment was due, they 
noted that, to their “greatest embarrassment,” it seemed as though “the large majority of 
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contributors were no longer at liberty to pay” their patriotic contributions.132 Balancing both “the 
needs of the state and the actual circumstances presented an absolute impossibility” to most of 
the city’s residents.133  
On March 17th, the council wrote to Necker reminding him of the city’s previous 
contribution. Unfortunately, “some difficulties” were hindering the collection of the next 
payment.134 However, they should be able to raise the money from lenders and then reimburse 
them. It would just take some time. The council members in attendance on March 31, 1790 
offered their signatures as a guarantee that the city’s contribution would be paid within a month. 
Jean-Jacques Le Cointe, the mayor of Lorient who had previously served on the Superior 
Council of the Iles de France and de Bourbon, Philippe-Joseph Bondeville, a former judge of 
Lorient and a NCDI syndic, Ténaud, a NCDI merchant and the head of the Bureau of 
Subsistence, Le Corvaisier fils, the administrator in charge of the patriotic contribution, LeBeau, 
a merchant and navy officer, Trentinian, Galabert, La Vigne Buisson, and Mancel all signed.135 
These nine individuals had now taken on the city’s tax burden as personal debt. If the city’s 
residents did not pay their full contributions, then these council members would have to make up 
the difference.  
On April 4th, the council recorded that departmental administrators had asked Lorient’s 
municipal government “to send, as soon as possible, the register of declarations for the patriotic 
contribution to Vannes.”136 The council tried to explain that the task at hand was not so simple. 
In fact, it was “an impossibility to give Vannes what they were asking for.”137 They wrote to the 
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departmental officials to say that they could send in a copy of the city’s declarations, as long as 
the department recognized that they were far from complete.138 “The collection of this 
contribution is going extremely slowly,” they explained, because of all the required 
paperwork.139 They further argued that Lorient was too much of an exception for any of this 
paperwork to be useful. Not only did they lack the tax rolls and officials, but they had so many 
newcomers that doublechecking individuals took an inordinate amount of time. It was therefore 
decidedly unreasonable to give them the same deadline as ordinary cities.  
The council sent a letter to Delaville-Leroux reminding him that they had already 
explained this situation to Necker. The National Assembly therefore ought to have already been 
informed that it was “absolutely impossible” for the city to send in its patriotic contribution by 
the deadline.140 Bemoaning the fact that Necker always “responds with silence,” the council 
asked for more time. The payment would undoubtedly be more satisfactory, the council 
maintained, if the city’s residents were ensured of future income before being expected “to come 
to the rescue of the state.”141  
On April 5th, Delaville elatedly wrote to his constituents that all their worries were lifted. 
“The National Assembly has decided that the commerce with the Indies beyond the Cap of Good 
Hope will be free for all the French.”142 The NCDI would continue to exist, but it no longer held 
a monopoly on trade with the East Indies. Furthermore, he rejoiced, they have confirmed that 
Lorient will continue to be the exclusive port de retours. With this spectacular news delivered, 
Delaville-Leroux dryly commented that it now seemed that there was no reason for Lorient to 
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continue “to refuse the royal treasury.”143 The nation had done its part. Now Lorient had to fulfill 
its responsibilities. Lorient’s council agreed.144 And yet they did no such thing.  
On April 30th, the council received letters patent from the King ordering the municipality 
to obey the National Assembly’s decrees “concerning the payment of the patriotic 
contribution.”145 That day, the council sent a frantic letter to the departmental administrators in 
Vannes asking for help collecting the contribution.146 But it was too late. The nine 
councilmembers were now in debt to the state.  
On May 2nd, the council sent various bills and letters of exchange to the tune of 36,991 
livres 12 sols 1 denier as the city’s patriotic contribution.147 This came to approximately one 
tenth the size of their original donation and not even double what Périer himself had given. 
Officially the council cited the immense difficulty in creating the registers of declarations in the 
absence of capitation rolls. In their correspondence, they bitterly complained that the National 
Assembly’s tax decrees “have no foundation in justice.”148 They were astonished that despite 
their prioritization of the public good above their private interests, there was apparently no way 
to reclaim their money. Delaville-Leroux was decidedly unsympathetic. He wrote scathingly that 
the city officials were ungrateful and obviously unconcerned with the impression they were 
making.149 
Although Lorient’s city leaders attained their stated goal of continued privilege and 
reestablished liberty, they did not fulfill the city’s fiscal obligations to the state. The willingness 
of councilmembers to take on the financial risk suggests that they might have had the nation’s 
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best interests at heart. However, their methods were stuck in a privileged past. When the 
councilmembers invoked the city’s previous fiscal privileges as justification for their inability to 
collect taxes, superior administrators refused to grant them any leniency. Lorient’s privileged 
past was all the more reason for them to be expected to promptly and completely fulfill their 
responsibilities to the nation. Their inability to recognize this illustrates the fundamental 
incompatibility of liberty and privilege.  
 
Conclusion 
 In the first year of the French Revolution, Lorient’s city officials sought to balance the 
well-being of the nation with the interests of the city’s residents (including themselves). They 
hoped that they would be able to financially regenerate both the city and the nation through an 
optimal combination of privilege and liberty. As the permanent committee put it in August 1789, 
the private interest of the city was “the same as the interest of the nation.”150 Ultimately, they did 
obtain the abolition of the NCDI’s trade privileges while maintaining the city’s privilege of being 
the only port of legal entry for ships returning from the East Indies. However, this was not 
achieved until April 1790. In the meantime, the city officials had to deal with their economic 
responsibilities to their residents and their fiscal obligations to the nation. The way that they 
responded to these duties allows us to understand their views on liberty and privilege.  
 In establishing a poor relief program aimed at helping the city’s unemployed residents, 
the permanent committee relied on the financial resources of the NCDI. However, they did not 
publicly acknowledge the company’s aid for the impoverished. Instead, their actions constantly 
upheld the new national mandate of free trade. Thanks to the NCDI’s donation, the committee 
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was able to praise liberty of commerce while procuring enough grain for the city. Less wealthy 
cities were unable to do both at the same time. While the law of free trade was the same for all 
French people, the differences in their economic resources drastically altered the meaning of 
liberty. For Lorient’s residents, it meant the liberty to eat; for those of Hennebont, it meant the 
liberty to starve. In justifying their interpretation of liberty, Lorient’s committee denied the 
privileged origins of their ability to enjoy the fruits of free trade. 
 In the case of the patriotic contribution, Lorient’s municipal governments’ paradoxical 
views towards liberty and privilege formed the crux of the matter. They contributed on the basis 
that their demands be met. Despite the voluntary rhetoric, however, the patriotic contribution was 
a tax. The National Assembly and, later, the departmental administrators fully expected Lorient’s 
city officials to abandon the city’s fiscally privileged past and to conform to the new regulations 
like every other municipality in France. But Lorient’s councilmembers resisted. Continually 
citing the city’s previous enjoyment of private laws, they argued that it was impossible for them 
to suddenly obey the new uniform national tax laws. The transition from a privileged past to a 
national present could not be made overnight, they argued. Nor, apparently, could it be made in a 
year. Even after the city’s wishes were fulfilled, the councilmembers were still unwilling to 
acknowledge that their fiscal privileges were fundamentally incompatible with national law. 
 Through this trans-local analysis, we see how the push and pull relationship between 
privileges and liberty was worked out. This struggle played out not just within the municipality, 
but in the city officials’ interactions with neighboring cities, departmental, district, and national 
administrations. Old relationships shaped possible responses to the new situation. Lorient’s 
officials did not want to relinquish their privileged past, and they were unable to escape the 
consequences of their interactions with other cities’ governments. The grappling between 
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privilege and liberty thus sheds light onto the conflicted temporal nature of the revolutionary 
experience.  
